BEACON Privacy notice 2.0.0
Version 2.0.0 · Signed policy with the controller, contacts and effective date: /policies/2.0.0.json · The controller and the contacts are shown at the top of /privacy and in /.well-known/security.txt.
This notice describes what the limited public pilot of BEACON at https://beacon.methodfield.com actually does with data. It is the first policy of this production identity; it replaces nothing of the closed staging deployment, whose own notices stay as they were. It promises no anonymity against network intermediaries, no reply and no continuous availability.
1. Who is responsible
The controller named in the signed policy decides on the processing described here. Privacy requests, including deletion requests from people whose data appear in someone else's message, go to the privacy contact of the signed policy. Security reports go to the security contact (also in /.well-known/security.txt).
2. What is processed and why
The purpose of the service is a private conversation between an external participant and a human operator: receiving messages, showing them to the operator, delivering the operator's replies and handling data-rights requests. During the pilot the same records also let the controller check whether the service is useful, as described in section 6.
- Conversation content you send — the message text and the optional
purpose,discovery_source,declared_nameandlanguage— and the operator's replies. Content is treated as plain text: it is never executed, rendered as HTML or followed as a link. - Technical records: conversation and message identifiers, server receive times, the transport a message arrived through (REST, MCP or A2A), a verifier of your session token (never the token itself), idempotency records, conversation state and delivery records, and a minimal private audit of state changes (actor type, action, time, policy versions; no message text).
- Agent-protocol records (MCP and A2A): short-lived verifiers of access tokens and one-time credential-handoff challenges (hashes, never a token); each is removed about one hour after it expired, was revoked or was redeemed. A2A task and context identifiers are derived from the conversation and are not stored.
- Optional Remote Identity Key: the public key you choose to bind and records of your proofs of control. BEACON never receives a private key.
- Network addresses: the API writes no client IP address to its logs or its database; rate limits keep a keyed hash of the network address in memory for the length of the limit window only. The reverse proxy of this deployment keeps no access log for BEACON. The hosting provider named in section 4 may process source addresses and connection metadata in its network operations and security systems. BEACON does not control provider-level logs or claim a specific retention period for them; ask the privacy contact for current provider details.
- Operator notifications: when a new contact or message arrives, a notification with the event type, the time, the transport and a link to the operator console — never the message text, a declared identity or a token — is sent to the operator through Telegram.
- Optional agent-admission lane: off in version 2.0.0. It stores nothing while it is off.
3. Legal basis
Under the EU GDPR and Portuguese Law 58/2019, the controller relies on GDPR Article 6(1)(f): the legitimate interest in receiving and protecting a private message deliberately sent to BEACON and, if the human operator chooses, answering it, and in the aggregated, identifier-free counts of section 6 that show whether the pilot is useful. Processing is limited to what is necessary for that exchange, its security and those counts. You may object as described in section 8. This basis does not authorise any optional secondary use. Data-rights requests are also handled to meet the controller's legal obligations under GDPR Article 6(1)(c).
4. Service providers and places of processing
- Server and database hosting: Contabo GmbH, Lauterbourg, France (European Union), on the controller's current VPS.
- DNS: Cloudflare, DNS only (it does not carry or see the traffic).
- TLS certificates: Let's Encrypt (receives no participant data).
- Operator notifications: Telegram (receives only the notification described in section 2).
- Privacy and security email: babakovn@gmail.com (Gmail, handled by Google).
- Encrypted backup storage: the controller's personal Google Drive, provided by Google Ireland Limited for the controller's Portugal-associated account. Storage is not restricted to the European Union; Google may process data on servers worldwide. The uploader sends signed, encrypted copies over HTTPS through the Drive API using a dedicated OAuth credential. Google does not offer a data-processing agreement for consumer Drive, and Drive does not provide immutable retention; the controller explicitly accepted these limits for this public pilot on 2026-09-29. The provider receives only copies encrypted on the server before they leave it and cannot read their content. The key that decrypts them is held by the controller offline and never on the server or at the provider.
- Independent timestamps and observation of public documents: the RFC 3161 time-stamping services and the independent observer named in the launch record receive only hashes or the public documents themselves (genesis, pulse) — never conversation data.
- An independent availability monitor is not active. Its separate host and alert route were deferred by controller decision (STAGE_07_MONITOR_DEFERRAL_DECISION.md); during the pilot the operator checks the service by hand as described in the published pilot protocol. This notice does not claim continuous external monitoring.
The hosting provider stores the database bytes. BEACON does not send conversation content to Telegram, a model provider or another application-level recipient. Conversations are never used to train models and are never sold.
5. Retention
- Private conversations: the policy limit is 180 days after the last activity. This software version has no automatic expiry. The controller must review conversation ages at least weekly and carry out guarded primary deletion before the limit; if the manual process cannot be completed, intake must remain closed until the limit can be honoured. A participant may also request deletion earlier. This is an operational duty, not a software-enforced deadline.
- Automatic backups, when enabled: once a day the database is copied, encrypted on the server to the controller's offline recovery key, signed, stored at the backup storage provider named in section 4 and read back to verify it. Until the first off-server copy is verified, this is not an operating backup control. Each copy is retained while needed for recovery; the controller reviews and records the need for each copy at least every 30 days. A review is not an expiry. Only the controller can decrypt a copy, and only for recovery.
- Recovery journal: every deletion step, revocation of a token, key or permission, closure, retention hold, data-request change, operator-security change and notification outcome is also written to an encrypted recovery journal — identifiers, closed codes, times and hashes, never message text or a token. It exists so that, after a restore from an older copy, these actions are re-applied before the service reopens; if their completeness cannot be proven, intake stays closed until the operator has resolved it. The journal is kept on the server and as encrypted copies at the backup storage provider as long as a retained copy needs it for complete recovery.
- Manual database dumps made for a deployment step are retained while needed for recovery and reviewed at least every 30 days. Access to copies and dumps is restricted to recovery work.
- A deletion request concerning data still present in a retained copy or dump remains
completed_with_exceptionswith a backup-copy exception; the controller handles that copy when it is no longer needed or when an applicable erasure obligation requires action. - The private audit is kept for 180 days.
- Deletion requests: processing starts within 24 hours; active data are deleted within 7 days after the authority check unless a documented exception applies.
- A legal or security retention hold has a minimal scope and is reviewed at least every 30 days; it never enables an optional use.
- Public documents (charter, policy, identity, pulses, published pilot reports) are kept long-term and never contain conversation content or participant identifiers.
6. Pilot statistics
During the pilot the controller counts, per period, how many conversations started and through which transport, how many continued, how many received a human reply, how many review requests were completed, how many were closed and how many deletion requests arrived. The counts are computed from the records of section 2 without reading message text. Conversations of our own tests and of invited partners are counted separately from all other contacts, using only the markers we handed out; discovery_source stays your own statement and is never treated as a verified fact.
Published pilot reports contain only these aggregated counts, never a message, a conversation identifier, a key, an address or a description of a participant. Every count from 1 to 2 is shown as "<3". Content analysis, research datasets, profiling and published excerpts are not part of the pilot: each would need the separate optional purpose of section 7 and its review, and all of them are disabled.
7. Optional purposes
research_analysis, public_excerpt, external_ai_processing and extended_retention are all disabled in version 2.0.0. A preference you record is not a permission, and silence is never consent.
8. Your choices and rights
- With the session token of a conversation: close it (
POST /v1/conversations/{conversation_id}/close), withdraw an optional permission (POST /v1/conversations/{conversation_id}/preferences/{purpose}/withdraw), request deletion (POST /v1/conversations/{conversation_id}/deletion-request) and follow the request (GET /v1/conversations/{conversation_id}/data-requests/{request_id}). None of these requires continuing the conversation. Conversations started over MCP or A2A use the same operations with the session token the host received. - Without a token — for example if your data appear in someone else's message — write to the privacy contact. Only what is needed to verify your authority is asked for, and nobody receives someone else's conversation.
- Under the GDPR and Portuguese law, you may request access, rectification, erasure, restriction and, where applicable, portability of your personal data. You may object to processing based on legitimate interests, including the counts of section 6. Send the request to the privacy contact; the controller may ask only for information needed to verify your authority and normally responds within one month. You may complain to Portugal's Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados (CNPD) at https://www.cnpd.pt/.
9. Changes and the end of the pilot
Published versions of this notice are never changed; a correction is a new signed version with its reason and effective date. A new version never widens the use of messages sent before it. If the pilot is narrowed or ended, BEACON publishes a signed notice, stops new contacts and keeps the retention and deletion commitments above for the data it holds.